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Despite relevant insights from socio-economics, little research in multi-agent 
systems has addressed the interconnections between trust and normative notions 
such as contracts and sanctions. Focusing our attention on scenarios of betray-
al, in this paper we combine the use of trust and sanctions in a negotiation pro-
cess. We describe a scenario of dyadic relationships between truster agents, 
which make use of trust and/or sanctions, and trustee agents, characterized by 
their ability and integrity, which may influence their attitude toward betrayal. 
Both agent behavior models are inspired in socio-economics literature. Through 
simulation, we show the virtues and shortcomings of using trust, sanctions, and 
a combination of both in processes of selection of partners. 
 
   
1 Introduction 
Computational trust models are important when 
addressing social relationships, both in the real world 
and in artificial agent societies. Trust is used to tackle 
the problem of social control. Additionally, norms 
and sanctions also play an important part by exerting 
pressure on individuals to conform. A number of 
studies from the social sciences look into interrela-
tionships between these issues. 
Social relations are often associated with uncer-
tainty and vulnerability of interacting partners. These 
relations are traditionally secured by ongoing interac-
tions, where interacting partners trust each other 
[HARDIN, 2001]. In fact, social scientists often con-
sider that trust is the fuel of society [LUHMANN, 
1979; LEWIS and WEIGERT, 1985]. However, not 
all relations are trust relations: the reality of present 
days indicates the urge for new forms of relation-
ships, mainly in business and in social networks, to 
be formed more quickly and, more and more, with 
anonymous others, or strangers. This may happen by 
need, or just because opportunities for better deals ex-
ist outside the committed relation [YAMAGISHI and 
YAMAGISHI, 1994; MACY and SKVORETZ, 
1998]. 
Without valid alternatives to trust, opportunism – 
which can be defined as “some form of cheating or 
undersupply relative to an implicit or explicit con-
tract” [WATHNE and HEIDE, 2000] – will arise. 
Governance mechanisms used to reduce opportunism 
include incentives, control and monitoring. In fact, 
one approach to break out low trust dynamics in bi-
lateral relationships is to use legalistic remedies, in-
cluding the use of formal contracts [SAKO, 1998]. 
Luhmann [LUHMANN, 1979] suggests that the ex-
istence of legal norms is one of the most effective 
remedies to confine the risk associated with lack of 
trust, making it more comfortable for a potential 
truster to decide to invest trust in a relationship: legal 
regulations and sanctions reduce the risk of being be-
trayed. Furthermore, legal norms can foster the con-
stitution of trust [BACHMANN, 2001]. However, de-
signing detailed contracts involves substantial 
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drafting and monitoring costs, especially when moni-
toring is difficult or when sanctions require extensive 
litigation [WILLIAMSON, 1979; MAYER et al., 
1995; MACY and SKVORETZ, 1998; WATHNE 
and HEIDE, 2000; HARDIN, 2004]. 
According to Mayer et al., legalistic remedies may 
bring organizational legitimacy but are often ineffec-
tive, being described as “impersonal substitutes for 
trust” [MAYER et al., 1995]. 
At this point, it seems reasonable to think that 
trust can be used to reduce transaction costs associat-
ed with negotiation, monitoring and enforcement 
[IRELAND and WEBB, 2007]. On the other hand, 
monitoring and enforcement have an important role 
when there is not appropriate evidence on which trust 
can be built, making the act of trust a risky engage-
ment [LUHMANN, 1979]. These concepts are there-
fore interconnected. 
Das and Teng [DAS and TENG, 1998] state that 
trust denotes expectancies about other agents’ moti-
vations; it is not meant to influence or affect their be-
havior. Control mechanisms, on the other hand, may 
be used with the intent of deterring opportunism. Das 
and Teng distinguish trust in a partner from confi-
dence in a transaction, that is, the certainty about co-
operative behavior regardless of the possible motiva-
tions of the trustee. Accordingly, confidence in a 
transaction may be obtained as a combination of trust 
and control: for the same sought level of confidence, 
if we trust less, we use more control mechanisms. 
Furthermore, trust and control are seen as parallel and 
supplementary notions: they contribute independently 
to the level of confidence. Any one of these mecha-
nisms may be used if an increased transaction confi-
dence is needed. 
Despite these relevant insights from socio-
economics, little research in multi-agent systems has 
addressed the interconnections between trust and 
normative notions such as contracts and sanctions. In 
this paper we try to cover this gap by combining, in a 
negotiation process, the use of trust and contractual 
sanctions in scenarios of betrayal, where violations of 
commitments are voluntary and harmful for the be-
trayed entity.1 More specifically, we formalize a 
model of agents (inspired in socio-economics litera-
ture) for dyadic relationships between truster agents 
that make use of trust and/or sanctions as a control 
                                                                  
1 This paper is based on and extends [URBANO 
et al., 2012]. 
mechanism, and trusted agents (or trustees) that are 
characterized by their ability and integrity, which dic-
tate their bias toward betrayal. We demonstrate in the 
paper that several forces must be weighted in the in-
terrelation between trust and norms, such as the abil-
ity and integrity of the trustees, the sanctioning costs 
and the motivation to betray, and that the quantifica-
tion of these forces is not a trivial task. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the scenario underlying our study and presents 
the behavior models for both trusters and trustees. 
Section 3 describes a set of experiments we have per-
formed and presents the results obtained. Section 4 
discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2 Scenario and agents’ be-
havior models 
We here describe our interaction scenario and pre-
sent the behavior model of the agents considered in 
this study. We address dyadic relationships with cli-
ents and providers of services. Clients are trusting 
agents (i.e. the trusters) who need to select the best 
providers for interaction, and providers are trusted 
agents (i.e. the trustees). 
A truster starts by sending a call-for-proposals 
(CFP) for a particular service, for which each trustee 
will provide his own proposal. When assessing pro-
posals, trusters take into account their utility2 and 
(optionally) the perceived trustworthiness of each 
proponent. The truster will try to establish a contract 
with the proponent of the better assessed proposal, for 
which it may decide to include control mechanisms in 
the contract. If, for some reason, the trustee is not 
able to accommodate this contract, the truster will try 
with the proponent of the second best proposal, and 
so on. At the contract enactment phase, each hired 
trustee will have the opportunity to fulfill the contract 
or to violate it, according to the behavior model de-
scribed later. 
                                                                  
2 The utility of a proposal reflects how close or 
how far its terms are from the conditions established 
in the CFP. Each proposal is generated after the CFP 
is received so that its terms have a slight and random 
deviation from the CFP’s conditions. 
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2.1 Trusters 
The truster behavior model is based on the inter-
play between trust and control, as discussed in [DAS 
and TENG, 1998] and [TAN and THOEN, 2000]. 
When considering the establishment of a contract 
with a trustee, the truster computes a confidence 
threshold Ct  that indicates the minimum confidence 
he needs for entering into that particular transaction. 
This value is calculated by weighting the perceived 
risk R  with the agent’s risk aversion Ra . Risk, in 
turn, is modeled as a function of the weight of the 
transaction volume Tv  on the agent's overall produc-
tion volume Pv  and the perceived trustworthiness 
T  of the trustee, computed dynamically using a 
computational trust model. We thus have that 
RaRCt *= , where risk )1(*/ TPvTvR −= .3 
Risk aversion ranges from 0 (a risk lover agent) to 1 
(totally risk averse). 
Having a minimum confidence threshold, the 
truster will propose, to a selected trustee, a contract 
that includes a level of control (represented as a sanc-
tion to apply in case of violation) computed accord-
ing to the general notion from [DAS and TENG, 
1998] that Confidence = Trust + Control. By sug-
gesting an appropriate sanction, the truster tries to 
raise his confidence on the contract that is to be es-
tablished with a particular trustee, of which it has 
some trustworthiness assessment. 
2.2 Trustees 
The model of behavior of the trustees is mainly 
inspired in the model of betrayal in organizations of 
Elangovan and Shapiro [ELANGOVAN and 
SHAPIRO, 1998]. Our model considers that each 
trustee has an inherent and predefined ability to pro-
vide a given product and a dispositional integrity, and 
that both dimensions shape the trustee’s trustworthy 
behavior [Mayer et al., 1995; ELANGOVAN and 
SHAPIRO, 1998; COLQUITT et al., 2007]. 
                                                                  
3 In our experiments we use ζ/T  instead of T , 
since it is our belief that computational trust models 
typically overrate trustworthiness estimations: they 
tend to aggregate the outcomes of past evidence using 
statistical methods, not taking into consideration the 
relationship that was active between the partners at 
the time of each evidence [URBANO et al., 2011]. 
Besides, our model considers that trustees can 
have two different types of faulty behavior. On the 
one hand, they can violate contracts due to their lack 
of ability or competence in providing a given product 
under the contractual conditions. On the other hand, 
they can engage in voluntary actions that severely vi-
olate the pivotal expectations of the truster. These vi-
olations take the form of betrayal and their conse-
quences on trust are devastating, because they disrupt 
ongoing and meaningful relationships in which part-
ners have invested material and	  intense emotional re-
sources [LEWIS and WEIGERT, 1985; 
ELANGOVAN and SHAPIRO, 1998; FITNESS, 
2001; CVETKOVICH et al., 2002; FINKEL et al., 
2002; POORTINGA and PIDGEON, 2004]. These 
betrayals are related with the integrity of the trustee. 
Elangovan and Shapiro’s model postulates that 
there are some conditions observed by the trustee that 
trigger the assessment of the current situational satis-
faction with the truster. If these conditions are absent, 
the trustee does not even consider betraying. These 
conditions are: need, crises, Machiavellianism, and 
opportunity recognition. In our model, we consider 
that the triggering conditions are the possible award-
ing of a new contract and the integrity of the trustee: 
in face of a more attractive business opportunity, the 
trustee may consider to voluntarily violate one of his 
active contracts (and, then, to betray the respective 
truster) in order to better accommodate the new con-
tract. However, trustees of high integrity are more re-
luctant to consider the new opportunity, possibly re-
jecting the new contract and keeping the status quo 
with his active interaction partners, while low integri-
ty trustees tend to consider the new opportunity more 
often. 
Following Elangovan and Shapiro’s model of be-
trayal, if the triggering conditions are strong enough 
to make the trustee assess the current situational satis-
faction with the truster, then the trustee starts evaluat-
ing the benefits of betraying, the relationship with the 
truster, and his own principles (closely related with 
ethics and integrity). This potentially leads to the 
formation of the motivation to betray. Finally, the ac-
tion of either betraying or keeping the status quo de-
pends on the trustee’s motivation to betray and on his 
assessment of the penalties associated to the betrayal 
[ELANGOVAN and SHAPIRO, 1998]. 
In what follows, we describe our model of betray-
ing, which is a simplified version of Elangovan and 
Shapiro’s model. We will give particular attention to 
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the behavior of trustees toward voluntary violations, 
i.e., violations that do not result from faulty behavior 
of trustees due to ability issues. 
Whenever necessary, we use a formalism in pseu-
do-logic that allows disambiguating important con-
siderations of our model. In the equations that follow, 
x  denotes a trustee, y  denotes a truster, c  denotes 
a contract, and p  denotes a contract proposal. When 
time-stamping terms using a superscript, we assume a 
discrete time line. 
The decision to betray vs. keep the status quo is 
made in a process that starts when the trustee is se-
lected for a new contract. The new contract is consid-
ered a business opportunity. As such, the agent will 
probabilistically consider betraying one of his active 
contracts. This betray propensity (henceforth ρ ) is 
inversely proportional to the integrity of the trustee, 
denoted as [ ]1,0∈δ . We may say that with a proba-
bility ρ  the trustee will consider betraying one of his 
active contracts c , provided that freeing the re-
sources that are allocated for upholding that contract 
enables him to accept the new contract (i.e. when 
Equation 1 holds). 
 
)(
)()(
pResources
cResourcesxcesFreeResour
>
+   (1) 
 
Active contracts are analyzed in decreasing order 
of utility.4 It is worth noting that even when the trus-
tee already has enough free resources to encompass 
the new contract, it will still consider betraying one 
of his active contracts. 
After identifying a new opportunity, the trustee is 
going to assess the current situation, namely: i) the 
benefits of betraying; and ii) his relationship with the 
potential victim of betrayal. It is worth to note that 
Elangovan and Shapiro’s model has a third situational 
assessment component, the assessment of principles. 
In our model, we decided to incorporate this compo-
nent into the betray propensity parameter described 
above; i.e., the principles of the trustee (related with 
his integrity) are used as triggers to the assessment of 
the situation, and not (directly) as one dimension of 
this assessment. 
                                                                  
4 The trustees evaluate the utility of their contracts 
taking into consideration the transactional volume 
and price associated to each of their contracts. 
2.2.1 Value of Betraying 
The trustee assesses the benefits of betraying by 
taking into account both the utility associated with 
the new opportunity and the existence of a relevant 
sanction associated with the contract that is to be pos-
sibly betrayed. This sanction is considered irrelevant 
to the trustee if its value is smaller than a given (ad-
justable) percentage γ  of the utility associated with 
the new opportunity. In this case, the value of betray-
al is high. In order to reduce the complexity of the 
model, we chose three qualitative values for the value 
of betraying, as illustrated in Equations 2-4. 
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2.2.2 Value of the Relationship 
The trustee assesses the relationship with the po-
tential victim by considering: (i) if the number of past 
contracts between both partners in the last σ  units of 
time exceeds a minimum value λ  (perspective of 
continuing the relationship, cf. Equation 5 where t 
denotes the current time step); and (ii) the existence 
of at least ξ other contracts in which the trustee is 
currently engaged (cf. Equation 6 where t denotes the 
current time step). The perceived value of the rela-
tionship is given in Table 1. 
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 HasOtherContracts 
PerspContinuity yes no 
high medium high 
¬high low medium 
Table 1. Value of the relationship 
 
The decision to betray a partner or instead to keep 
his trust takes into consideration the assessment made 
by the trustee concerning the values of betrayal and 
relationship. In case there is more than one contract 
which is deemed to be betrayed, the trustee will only 
betray the one with less utility, provided that its allo-
cated resources are enough to take into account the 
new contract. If no contract is deemed to be betrayed, 
the trustee may still accept the new contract provided 
that enough free resources are available. It is im-
portant to note that even new contracts may be later 
decided upon to be betrayed if another opportunity 
arises. Contracts are violated at enactment time, 
which means that the decision to betray is made much 
earlier than the act of betraying. 
Finally, while the trustee may decide not to betray 
a partner, he may still fail the contract if his ability is 
not good enough. 
3 Experiments 
In this section, we present the experiments we 
have run as support to our study. We used the trading 
scenario described in detail in the previous section. 
3.1 Experimental setup 
We have run three different set of experiments, 
each one using a different population of trustees, 
characterized by distinct values for the ability and in-
tegrity of the agents. Table 2 summarizes the differ-
ent populations of trustees. 
 
Population ability integrity 
Heterogeneous uniform 
distribution 
within 
[ ]1,5.0  
uniform distribution 
within 
{ }highmediumlow δδδ ,,  
Low Integrity lowδ  
High Integrity highδ  
Table 2. Trustee populations 
 
In all experiments of the three sets, we used the 
computational trust model described in [URBANO et 
al., 2009]. Each experiment was composed of 80 
rounds, and at every round each buyer started a new 
negotiation cycle by issuing a new call for proposals. 
At the first round of each experiment, the repository 
of trust evidence for every supplier was cleaned. We 
used 80 buyers and 120 suppliers. Every experiment 
was run 30 times. Table 3 shows the values we as-
signed to the model’s variables in the experiments. 
The effective betrayal of contracts was configured 
probabilistically (see Table 4) taking into considera-
tion the assessed values of the benefits of betraying 
and of the relationship. 
 
lowδ  mediumδ  highδ  lowδρ  mediumδρ  highδρ  
0.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 
1γ  2γ  σ  λ  ξ  ζ  
0.0 0.2 3 2 1 4 
Table 3. Configuration of parameters 
 
 
 ValueBetrayal 
ValueRelationship High Medium Low 
High 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Medium 1.0 0.2 0.0 
Low 1.0 0.5 0.0 
Table 4. Betray probabilities 
 
3.1.1 Configuration of Trusters 
The sanction value was calculated 
as ζ/TCtS −= . This formula provides the rela-
tionship between the trustworthiness of a trustee and 
the level of sanctions S  that a truster will propose to 
be included in the contract. We start from the formu-
lation of STCt += , where for the reason explained 
before we reduce the weight of the trust parcel. Every 
truster has a value [ ]1,0∈Ra  picked randomly at 
setup, and a value Pv  also picked up randomly from 
a range of fixed minimum and maximum values. Tv  
is a dynamic value proposed by a trustee resulting 
from a specific contract negotiation. 
Whenever betrayed, the truster resents the betray-
er by ignoring any information regarding his previous 
activity, which has the effect of dropping his trust-
worthiness value to 0 (as assessed by the betrayed 
truster). 
The final desideratum of the experimental compo-
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nent of our work was to evaluate the performance of 
the different combinations of trust and sanctions 
when applied to processes of selection of partners. 
Therefore, we defined the following types of trusters: 
• None (N): The truster does not use sanctions nor 
trust. 
• Sanctions (S): The truster uses sanctions but 
does not select partners based on the trust. 
• Trust (T): The truster uses trust to select part-
ners but does not use sanctions. 
• Trust and Sanctions (T&S): The truster uses 
trust both to select partners and to compute sanc-
tions. 
The population of trusters used in all sets of experi-
ments followed a uniform distribution over the possi-
ble types described above. 
3.1.2 Configuration of Trustees 
In order to emulate the existence of a potential 
new opportunity (cf. Equation 1), all suppliers had a 
limited stock within a simulation round. The utility of 
a contract for a trustee is calculated by multiplying 
the dimension of the proposal (i.e. the quantity in the 
contract over the stock of the trustee) by the rele-
vance of the price in the proposal. 
3.1.3 Evaluation Variables 
In these experiments, we focused on observing the 
following evaluation variables: 
• supΔ : number of different suppliers selected by 
all buyers in one round.  
• o+ : number of contracts with positive outcome 
(that were not violated or betrayed) in a round. 
• O : number of opportunities to betray faced by 
the trustees. A trustee that has n active contracts 
when a new opportunity arises is confronted with 
n opportunities to betrayal. 
• β : number of effective betrayals suffered by all 
trusters in one round. 
• β/O : ratio of the number of effective betrayals to 
the number of opportunities to betray, indicating 
the effectiveness of the selection models in dis-
suading the trustees from betraying after identify-
ing a new opportunity to betray. 
• Ξ : number of contracts that were violated due to 
(lack of) ability. This variable is derived from the 
values of o+ and β. 
• Σ : average sanction applied by all trusters to the 
contracts they establish in each round. 
All variables took values in [ ]1,0 , all averaged over 
all rounds and all runs of the experiments. 
3.2 Results 
In this section, we present the results of the exper-
iments, for each one of the considered populations of 
trustees. 
In some cases, when the difference between the 
results of some variable in two different models were 
not too evident, we used a Paired Two Sample for 
Means (one-tail) t-Test in order to evaluate the statis-
tical significance of the results’ differences. We used 
Bonferroni adjustments considering 6 t-Test compari-
sons, which means that the obtained p-value must 
have been less than 0.008 for any one comparison to 
be considered significant (assuming we keep the 
overall experimentwise error rate to 5%). 
3.2.1 Heterogeneous Population 
The experimental results for the Heterogeneous 
population concerning the evaluation variables con-
sidered in Section 3.1.3 are shown in Table 5. 
The results in the Δsup evaluation metric show that 
agents that use trust in the selection process were less 
exploratory (T: 0.880, T&S: 0.878) than agents that 
did not use trust (N: 0.963, S: 0.966). In the same 
way, these trust-based agents were significantly more 
exposed to betray, as shown by variable O (T: 0.307, 
T&S: 309), than the other agents (N: 0.127, S: 0.126). 
One important variable to look at is the number of 
positive outcomes (o+), i.e., the number of contracts 
that were neither betrayed nor violated due to ability 
issues. We can observe in Table 5 that agents of type 
T&S outperformed the remaining agents in this vari-
able. Indeed, agents of type T&S got more positive 
outcomes than T agents (T: 0.833, T&S: 0.846, t[1]=-
5.78, p<0.001) and significantly better performance 
than agents of types S (0.721) and N (0.708). 
Another important variable is the rate of material-
ized betrayals (β/O). Both of the truster types using 
sanctions achieved better performances on this issue 
(the results for these types are not statistically signifi-
cantly different: S: 0.132, S&T: 0.143, t[1]=-0.85, 
p=0.20). Agents of type N performed worse than T 
agents (N: 0.217, T: 0.180, t[1]=3.18, p=0.002). Tak-
ing into consideration the two best truster types in the 
β/O metric, we can see that T&S agents used a much 
lighter sanction value Σ (0.096) that S agents did 
(0.230). 
Urbano, J. et al  Trust and Normative Control in Multi-Agent Systems 
 
 
 
49 
 
In terms of effective betrayals (β), S agents per-
formed best than all other agents: agents of type N 
got more betrayals than agents of type S (N: 0.028, S: 
0.017, t=5.51, p<0.001), and T agents got more be-
trayals (0.055) than T&S agents (0.044). 
Finally, it is evident that trust-based models are 
more efficient in preventing violations due to lack of 
ability (Ξ) of trustees than the remaining models (N: 
0.265, S: 0.262, T: 0.112, T&S: 0.180). As can be ob-
served, S agents cannot do better than N agents con-
cerning this issue. 
 
 
 
 supΔ  +o  O  β  O/β  Ξ  Σ  
None (N) 0.963 0.708 0.127 0.028 0.217 0.265 0.000 
Sanctions (S) 0.966 0.721 0.126 0.017 0.132 0.262 0.230 
Trust (T) 0.880 0.833 0.307 0.055 0.180 0.112 0.000 
T&S 0.878 0.846 0.309 0.044 0.143 0.180 0.096 
Table 5. Experimental results for Heterogeneous trustee population 
 
 
 supΔ  +o  O  β  O/β  Ξ  Σ  
None (N) 0.962 0.694 0.203 0.052 0.256 0.254 0.000 
Sanctions (S) 0.961 0.709 0.207 0.034 0.167 0.257 0.219 
Trust (T) 0.851 0.783 0.555 0.116 0.210 0.102 0.000 
T&S 0.861 0.808 0.562 0.089 0.159 0.104 0.093 
Table 6. Experimental results for Low Integrity trustee population 
 
 
 supΔ  +o  O  β  O/β  Ξ  Σ  
None (N) 0.967 0.732 0.046 0.006 0.120 0.263 0.000 
Sanctions (S) 0.967 0.735 0.045 0.002 0.051 0.262 0.217 
Trust (T) 0.894 0.866 0.108 0.011 0.107 0.122 0.000 
T&S 0.896 0.870 0.109 0.010 0.092 0.120 0.086 
Table 7. Experimental results for High Integrity trustee population 
 
 
3.2.2 Low Integrity Population 
The experimental results for the Low Integrity 
populations are shown in Table 6. 
Similarly to what happen with the heterogeneous 
population, we verified that trust-based models were 
less explorative (Δsup) than the remaining models (N: 
0.962, S: 0.961, T: 0.851, T&S: 0.861), which is in-
versely correlated with the opportunities to betray (N: 
0.203, S: 0.207, T: 0.555, T&S: 0.562). 
In the same way, we verified once again that the 
models that use sanctions were more effective regard-
ing the rate of materialized betrayals (β/O), where the 
mean value obtained by agents of type S (0.167) was 
not significantly different from the equivalent mean 
value for T&S agents (0.159) (t[1]=0.99, p=0.17). 
Concerning these truster types, T&S agents were able 
to use a lighter value of sanction Σ (0.093) than S 
agents (0.219). Agents that use trust but not sanctions 
could, even though, achieve a better value for β/O 
than agents that did not use trust neither sanctions (N: 
0.256, T: 0.210). 
In terms of the total value of positive outcomes 
(o+), both trust-based truster types outperformed the 
types that do not use trust in the selection process. 
T&S got more positive outcomes than T agents, bene-
fiting from using sanctions (T: 0.783, T&S: 0.808, 
t[1]=-4.85, p<0.001). Concerning the trusters that do 
not use trust, S agents got a light advantage of about 
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2% over N agents (N: 0.694, S: 0.709, t[1]=-4.04, 
p<0.001). 
Once again, it is evident that trust-based models 
are more efficient in preventing violations due to the 
lack of ability (Ξ) of trustees than the remaining 
models (N: 0.254, S: 0.257, T: 0.102, T&S: 0.104). 
The results of T agents and T&S agents were not sta-
tistically significantly different (T: 0.102, T&S: 
0.104, t[1]=-1.10, p=0.14), and neither were the re-
sults of N and S agents (N: 0.254, S: 0.257, t[1]=-
0.85, p=0.20). 
Finally, S agents were the ones that got less be-
trays, in absolute terms (N: 0.052, S: 0.034, T: 0.116, 
T&S: 0.089). 
3.2.3 High Integrity Population 
The experimental results for the High Integrity 
population are shown in Table 7. 
The results confirm the expected lower values of 
exploration of agents that use trust-based models 
when compared with the those that do not use trust to 
select partners (N: 0.967, S: 0.967, T: 0.894, T&S: 
0.896). T and T&S agents’ exploration rate is about 
92%-93% of the rate of N and S agents, a value that 
is greater to what happened when using the popula-
tion Low Integrity (88%-90%). This may be ex-
plained by the fact that the population in general is 
more trustworthy (as the integrity of agents is higher 
and the ability remained unchanged) and therefore 
trust-based agents are less parochial in their selection 
choices. 
The values of positive outcomes obtained using 
trust-based models were 18-19% higher than those 
obtained by trusters that do not use trust. The mean 
values of o+ obtained by both T and T&S agents 
were not significantly different (T: 0.866, T&S: 
0.870, t[1]=-1.55, p=0.067). This may indicate that 
when the opportunities to betrayal are low, the use of 
sanctions may not be relevant. The mean values of 
o+ obtained by N agents and S agents were not sig-
nificantly different (N: 0.732, S: 0.735, t[1]=-1.30, 
p=0.10). 
As the population shows high integrity, the oppor-
tunities to betray are rather low for all types of agents 
(N: 0.046, S: 0.045, T: 0.108, T&S: 0.109), which 
translates also in low values of effective betrayals. 
We verified that N agents suffered more betrayals 
than S agents (N: 0.006, S: 0.002, t[1]=2.76, 
p=0.005), and that the mean values of betrayals ob-
tained by both T and T&S agents were not signifi-
cantly different (T: 0.011, S&T: 0.010, t[1]=2.11,	  
p=0.021). In any case, all these values are almost re-
sidual, even for trust-based models. 
Once again, we verified that the trusters that use 
sanctions were more effective regarding the rate of 
materialized betrayals (β/O), where the mean value 
obtained by S agents was not significantly different 
from the equivalent mean value for T&S agents (S: 
0.051, S&T: 0.092, t[1]=-2.20, p=0.018). T&S agents 
were able to use a lighter value of sanction (0.086) 
than S agents (0.217). 
Finally, it is evident that trust-based models were 
more efficient in preventing violations due to the lack 
of ability (Ξ) of trustees than the remaining models 
(N: 0.263, S: 0.262, T: 0.122, S&T: 0.120). 
4 Discussion 
The results presented in the previous section for 
the different populations have shown that T&S is the 
best selection model concerning the total number of 
positive outcomes, i.e., the number of contracts that 
were neither failed due to lack of ability of trustees 
nor betrayed by them. This is due to the combined ef-
fect of using trust – which proved to be very effective 
in avoiding trustees with lower ability – and sanctions 
– which have shown to have an important role in per-
suading the trustees to maintain the status quo after 
identifying an opportunity to betray. 
In our study, we settle an extremely complex sce-
nario, with different models of behavior for trusters 
and trustees, where both models were inspired in the-
oretical works on normative control and trust. How-
ever, the novelty of such an approach came with a 
price: the resulting model had a great number of vari-
ables, potentially influencing each other, which hard-
ened the analysis of the experimental results. For in-
stance, a not irrelevant bias of our model is related to 
the fact that trusters that selected partners based on 
utility and trust were more exposed to potential be-
trayals (as shown by the opportunities of betrayal var-
iable) than trusters that selected based only on the 
utility of the proposals. Indeed, the fact that the latter 
explored more partners implied that each trustee had 
fewer active contracts at one time, and consequently 
less potential contracts to consider betraying when a 
new opportunity arose. 
The mentioned bias reflected directly on the re-
sults of the betray variable. Therefore, it is probably 
wiser to take into consideration the results of the β/O 
Urbano, J. et al  Trust and Normative Control in Multi-Agent Systems 
 
 
 
51 
 
variable (i.e., how many opportunities of betrayal do 
materialize into an effective betrayal) rather than the 
results on the betrayal variable, in order to understand 
the effectiveness of each selection model in prevent-
ing betrayals. We verified that both selection models 
that use sanctions (S and T&S) have shown similar 
performance in this variable. However, the T&S 
model had the additional advantage of using lighter 
sanctions. This happened, once again, due to the 
complementary action of trust and sanctions: by se-
lecting the most trustworthy agents and considering 
that sanctions were drafted (also) taking into account 
the perceived trustworthiness of trustees, the value of 
the applied sanction was reduced. 
The study we presented in this paper is novel, in 
the sense that it experimentally analyzed the com-
bined effect of trust and normative control (in the 
form of sanctions) in the process of selecting part-
ners. Also, it used models of behavior more realistic 
than the models generally used to test trust and norms 
(standalone), which are generally probabilistic and 
static. However, our model and our work present lim-
itations that must be taken into consideration in future 
work. For instance, even though the behavioral mod-
els drink from theoretical insights on trust and sanc-
tions, the overall model is not empirically grounded. 
A second limitation concerns the simplifications 
that were done to the Elangovan and Shapiro’s model 
in order to reduce its complexity. A way to more 
closely follow the model without introducing unbear-
able experimental complexity must be addressed in 
the future. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented an empirical study 
about the interrelations between trust and norms. This 
study was grounded on solid theory from diverse re-
search areas concerning trust and norms. The novelty 
of this study concerned the experimental exploration 
of the complex relationships between factors such the 
ability and integrity dimensions of trustworthiness, 
risk, sanctions and betrayals. From the gained experi-
ence in this work, we concluded that the conjunctive 
use of trust and norms – described in theoretic works 
as a promising interrelated governance mechanism – 
is not a trivial task. Several variables exist that must 
be accounted for when relating sanctions and trust. 
Even though our model of agents’ behavior is 
more realistic than the simple static and probabilistic 
models that are usually implemented to (individually) 
evaluate normative and trust models, it is limited by 
the fact that it is not empirical. Therefore, the best it 
can do is to support our understanding about what is 
the best conjugation of trust and sanctions, in condi-
tions similar to the ones generated by our model. 
However, the results obtained in these conditions 
confirm the theoretically suspicion that the interrelat-
ed use of trust and sanctions is beneficial in selection 
processes where interacting partners are not neces-
sarily engaged in ongoing relationships. 
As future work, we intend to explore different 
other ways of conjugating trust and sanctions in the 
process of drafting of sanctions. We also intend to 
explore other interaction scenarios, where the behav-
ior of agents (trusters and trustees) is driven by their 
intrinsic ability, integrity, and benevolence factors. 
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